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LIBERTARIAN CHOICE
Stewart Goetz

In this paper, I develop a noncausal view of agency. I defend the thesis that
choices are uncaused mental actions and maintain, contrary to causal theorists of action, that choices differ intrinsically or inherently from nonactions.
I explain how they do by placing them in an ontology favored by causal
agency theorists (agent-causationists). This ontology is one of powers and
liabilities.
After explicating how a choice is an uncaused event, T explain how an
adequate account of freedom involves the concept of choosing for a reason.
Choosing for a reason is a teleological notion, and I set forth what is
involved in making a choice for a purpose.

Libertarianism or agency theory is a central thesis in many positions in
the philosophy of religion. For example, in philosophizing about the
problem of evil, many theists advocate the thesis that human free will
(choice) is an essential component of any defense or theodicy. Though I
am sympathetic with the position of these theists, the role of free will
vis-a-vis the problem of evil is not my concern in this paper. Rather, the
issue of choice per se is what concerns me. Theists who address the issue
of freedom and incorporate it in their theistic philosophy have routinely
thought of libertarianism in terms of agent-causation. Thus, in his
advice to Christian philosophers, Alvin Plantinga maintains that U[w]hat
is really at stake in [the discussion of libertarianism versus determinism]
is the notion of agent causation".1 Similarly, in his discussion of duty
and divine goodness, Thomas Morris says that I/[a] great many theists
favor a libertarian (agent-causation) analysis of free action."2 Finally, in
her discussion of Hell, Marilyn Adams asserts that a realistic picture of
human agency includes the idea that "[wle adults with impaired freedom are responsible for our choices ... in the sense that we are the agent
causes of them."3
Contrary to what these Christian philosphers suggest, agent-causation is not required for constructing an adequate libertarian account of
freedom. Elsewhere, I have argued that agent-causation is actually
superfluous for this purpose/ and in this paper I develop a non-causal
account of libertarianism in which a choice is essentially an uncaused
mental action done for a reason, purpose, or telos. s Libertarians have
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argued in the past/ and continue to argue,' that a libertarianism in
which a free action is an uncaused teleological event is ultimately indefensible. In opposition to these causal agency theorists, I defend a libertarian view in which it is a conceptual truth that a choice is essentially an
uncaused purposeful mental action. S
In Section I, it is argued that understanding a choice as an uncaused
mental action satisfies a desideratum of any libertarian theory, namely,
that it be able to explain how mental actions differ from mental nonactions or mere happenings. This noncausalist view of choice is developed
in an ontology where a mental power is an ultimate and irreducible
property of an agent. To perform a mental act is to exercise a mental
power. To choose is to exercise the mental power to choose.
Section II consists of a discussion of how an uncaused choice relates to
the issue of being free to choose otherwise. While the lack of causation is
necessary for the freedom to choose otherwise, it is not sufficient. In
addition to the lack of causation, an adequate account of freedom must
involve the concept of choosing for a reason. Explanation of a choice by a
reason is teleological or purposeful explanation and the nature of purposeful explanation is examined and defended in Section II.
lt is important to emphasize that the purpose of this paper is not to
argue against proponents of non-libertarian views of choice such as
compatibilism. Rather, the goal is to construct a positive and coherent
libertarian account of freedom. One reason often given for rejecting libertarianism is that it is not an internally consistent view. Because of this,
it is all the more important for a libertarian to articulate a coherent
account of freedom.
I

A desideratum which any libertarian or agency theory must satisfy is
that of being able to explain how it is that mental actions such as choices
differ from mental nonactions or mere happenings. 9 Like their nonagency opponents, many agent-causationists give a causal explanation:
mental actions differ from mental nonactions in terms of their causal
ancestry. They are not intrinsically different. However, while it is true
that a choice occurs in the context of and is dependent upon the occurrence of antecedent events (e.g., the coming to have reasons to act and
thinking about means to an end), it is plausible to think that a choice
does not derive its active character from these other events.
How can a choice be intrinsically active? In the following way: (i) a
choice is the exercising by an agent of his mental power to choose, where
(ij) the exercising of a mental power is essentially an uncaused event.
Consider 0). A mental power is an onto logically irreducible property
which is exhibited by an entity.lO Corresponding to a mental power is
the exercising of that power. Exercising a mental power is acting. One
kind of mental power an agent has is the mental power to choose. When
an agent exercises it, he chooses. Another mental power an agent has is
the mental power to reason or think about propositions and their logical
relations. When an agent exercises this power, he actively directs his
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attention to propositions and seeks to become aware of their implications in logical space.
Carl Ginet has recently defended an account of mental action which
maintains that any mental act differs intrinsically from passive mental
events. According to him, a mental act's intrinsic active nature consists
in its having an 'actish phenomenal quality'. This actish phenomenal
quality lacks the complex structure of a causal relation and, by itself, is
enough to make a choice an action. l1 However, it is unwise to characterize the intrinsic active nature of a mental act as a phenomenal quality.
Such a characterization suggests that a mental act has a certain quale or
feel about it which makes it intrinsically active and distinguishes it from
a passive mental event. This is a mistake. The exercising of the power
to choose, like any mental act, has no intrinsic feel to it. Thus, while I
may feel tired after exercising my power to think, which I do when I
think at length about free will, this active thinking itself has no intrinsic
quale any more than choosing does. The active nature of a mental event
consists solely in the exercising of a mental power. 12
If a mental action is an event which is the exercising of a power, what
is a mental nonaction or mere happening? It is what I will call the actualization of a mental liability. Like a mental power, a mental liability is an
ontologically irreducible property which is exhibited by a subject. When
a subject's mental liability is actualized, he is a patient. Something is
being done to him. One mental liability a subject has is the liability to
believe. When his liability to believe is actualized, he believes a proposition and he is a patient with respect to believing that propositionY
In summary, there are two types of mental properties, namely, powers and liabilities. These two kinds of properties are inherently different
from each other and each is an ultimate category in our ontology.
Corresponding to these two kinds of mental properties are two kinds of
events, namely, the exercising of a mental power and the actualization of
a mental liability. Like the properties themselves, these two kinds of
events are inherently different from each other such that any token or
instance of the kind 'being the exercising of a mental power' is intrinsically distinguished from any token or instance of the kind 'being the
actualization of a mental liability' .
Support for (ii) is conceptual in nature. An event which is efficiently
caused is produced by that cause and as such is an occurrence with
respect to which its subject is essentially passive. 14 An event is being
made to occur to the subject and it is not active with respect to that
event. Since an exercise of mental power is active in nature, it is not produced and, thus, cannot be caused.
The intrinsically active and uncaused nature of choosing is confirmed
by the epistemology of action. In commenting on causal theories of
action, Harry Frankfurt makes the following point about an agent's
knowledge of his action:
They [causal theories] are therefore committed to supposing that
a person who knows he is in the midst of performing an action
cannot have derived this knowledge from any awareness of
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what is currently happening but that he must have derived it
instead from his understanding of how what is happening was
caused to happen by certain earlier conditions .... This is what
makes causal theories implausible. They direct attention exclusively away from the events whose natures are at issue, and
away from the times at which they occur.1S

Frankfurt's remarks suggest the following point about mental action
such as choice. It is an epistemological feature of an agent who knows
that he is making a choice that he knows this while he is choosing. Given
this fact, it is natural to think that he knows that he is choosing by being
aware of the choice which he is making. However, if he knows in this
way that he is choosing, it seems to follow that choosing is intrinsically
different from a mere happening or passive event and that he is aware of
this difference. On a causal theory of action, however, an agent who
knows that he is choosing cannot possess this knowledge in virtue of his
awareness of the choice itself. This is because on a causal theory of
action a choice is not intrinsically different from a mere happening. In
themselves, the two are indistinguishable. Therefore, an agent can know
that he is choosing only by being aware of causal differences which distinguish the two events.
According to Frankfurt, a causal account of action implies that the
agent's attention must be directed away from the mental action which
he is performing in order for him to know that he is acting. Thus, a
causal theory is unable to account for a significant epistemological feature of mental action. However, while Frankfurt has directed our attention to an important epistemological feature of mental action, he unnecessarily obscures his point by suggesting that the problem with a causal
theory of action stems from what it implies about the temporal distance
separating a mental action from its cause. Thus, Frankfurt not only
maintains that a causal theory entails that an agent who knows that he is
choosing must derive his knowledge from an awareness of what causes
his choice, but also he maintains that the cause is a certain earlier event.
Because it is, the agent, who knows that he is choosing must be directing
his attention away from the time at which he is choosing.
If the problem with a causal theory of action pointed out by Frankfurt
were essentially linked with this temporal issue, the causal theorist
would have a rather obvious response. He could merely stipulate that
the cause which distinguishes his choice from a passive event happens
simultaneously with the choice. 1" Because the cause occurs simultaneously with the choice, there is no epistemological problem of the kind noted
by Frankfurt. It is true that the agent who knows that he is choosing
must look to a causal antecedent, but the causal antecedent is, in virtue of
its simultaneity with its effect, known immediately by the agent.
The epistemological problem with a causal theory of action pointed
out by Frankfurt is not essentially linked with temporal considerations.
Rather, it arises in light of the fact that agents who know that they are
performing mental actions possess this knowledge by being aware of the
. actions themselves, without reference to any cause of them. In the case
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of a choice, the exercising of the power to choose by the agent is essentially uncaused and intrinsically active and the agent knows that he is
choosing by being aware of the choice itself.
Recently, William Rowe has suggested that the exercising of a power
be regarded as an intrinsically uncaused active event. For example, in
elaborating on Thomas Reid's theory of agency Rowe says that I/[n]ot all
events have efficient causes. In particular, any event that consists in an
exertion of active power will lack an efficient cause."17 Nevertheless,
Rowe does not develop an account of choice which accords with the one
being developed here. Thus, he claims that an agent makes choices or
acts of will but these are caused by his uncaused exertion of his active
power to cause his act of will. 1s On the view of choice which is being
developed in this paper, an agent does not cause his acts of will (choices). Choosing is the exercise of the power to choose and the exercise of
this power is essentially uncaused and intrinsically active. There are
two considerations which recommend this view over Rowe's.
First, while I am aware of choosing (exercising my power to choose), I
am never aware of exercising my active power to cause my choice. 19
Second, if one is convinced of the reality of mental powers and their
exercisings as uncaused events, what is to be gained in a libertarian
account by positing a power to cause acts of will? Why not just say that
acts of will are exercisings of the power to choose and, because they are,
they are essentially uncaused?20 This view is simpler and exemplifies all
of the virtues of the competing accounU1
II

In addition to providing an explanation of how a choice is active and
not passive in nature, there is another reason for defending the view that
an act of choice is an essentially uncaused and intrinsically active exercising of the power to choose. This additional reason is that the occurrence of such an event helps to account adequately for the freedom to do
otherwise which has seemed to agency theorists to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility. If an agent's choice is not caused (or determined in any other way), it is the case that a necessary condition is fulfilled for being free to choose otherwise. However, it must not be
thought that an exercising of the power to choose is fortuitous or random because it lacks a cause. When an agent chooses, he has a reason
which explains that choice and a reason which would explain not making that choice or making another choice. This reason-giving structure
provides the context for choosing and choosing for a reason means that
a choice does not occur chaotically or randomly.
To illustrate how an uncaused choice can be made in a nonrandom
but responsible way, consider the following example. An agent P is considering whether or not to begin a relationship with a handsome and
successful colleague at the office. P desires that she begin this relationship. Moreover, P has been having marital difficulties with her husband. He is out of work, depressed, etc. P strongly desires that she go
home with her colleague one night (call this act 'C) but believes that
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performing such an act is morally wrong. She believes not only that it is
right for her not to do C but also that it is right for her to do B, which is
continuing to support her husband emotionally, sexually, financially,
etc., through his difficult time. Thus, P has a reason for doing C (to satisfy her desire to begin a relationship with her colleague at work) and a
different reason for doing B (to fulfill her marital commitment to her
husband). We can say that P's reasons constitute a set of background
psychological conditions for either choosing to do C or choosing to do B.
These reasons are neither sufficient for the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of choosing to do C nor for the occurrence or nonoccurrence of choosing
to do B. P will be free and responsible for either choice. Given this situation, the making of either choice will cohere with or will be nonrandom
in the light of the existing psychological conditions of P. The reasons P
has for doing either C or B underdetermine both choices, yet the making
of either would not be random.
In light of the above considerations, there is a distinction between a
choice's being random and there being no cause of (or determining condition for) its occurrence. A choice with respect to which an agent is free
and responsible has no cause of its occurrence. However, since it is
made for one of the reasons constituting his psychological make-up, it
will cohere with or be orderly in the context of those reasons. The choice
which is made because of a reason is not caused by the latter, and the
agent can either make or refrain from making that choice. If the critic
insists that a choice performed under the conditions just described is
nevertheless random because there is no causal, deterministic, lawlike or
necessitarian explanation of its performance, then his concept of a random choice is equivalent to the concept of a choice which is uncaused,
nondeterministic, nonlawlike or nonnecessitated. The advocate of a
noncausal theory of choice can plead guilty to the charge that his view
involves the making of random choices of this kind.
Galen Strawson recognizes that a libertarian "is likely to locate our
freedom in our possession of a power to choose."22 However, he argues
that the concept of a choice which is made for a reason cannot be part of
an adequate account of freedom. Two arguments which are similar in
nature are given by Strawson in support of his position. First, he asserts
that the claim to explain freedom in terms of a choice made for a reason
fails because such a concept entails an impossible regress of choices.
Such a regress is allegedly entailed because in order for an agent to be
responsible for his choice, he must be responsible for having the reason
for which he made the choice. But, in order to be responsible for having
that reason, he must have chosen to have it. And, in order to have chosen to have it, he must have had a reason for choosing to have it, ad
infinitum. Straws on concludes that libertarian freedom which involves a
choice made for a reason is impossible.
In response, the libertarian denies that an agent, in order to be free
with respect to his choice, must be free to choose to have the reason for
which he makes the choice. An agent cannot just choose to have a certain reason for acting in a specific way. This is because an agent's reason-giving structure is not something over which he has any direct con-
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trol. While it is true that an agent, in virtue of making certain choices,
can determine some of the reasons he will have in the future for performing certain kinds of actions, this is only an indirect control over his
reason-giving structure. 23 At some initial point, the reasons which an
agent had for making a choice will not be a matter over which he has
any kind of control. An agent must start with some reasons for making
choices, where those reasons were not themselves chosen. To maintain
otherwise would require that an agent, at some initial point, choose ex
nihilo (for no reason at all) to have reasons for acting. Given the plausible principle (call it the 'principle of universal explanation') that every
event has an explanation, this is impossible.
Strawson's second argument against the view that an agent's freedom
resides in a choice made for a reason claims that a choice made for a reason is rational and non-random (in the sense that it is adequately
explained by that reason) only if the agent makes that choice in light of
some further principle or reason which recommends that he choose for
that reason.
[I]f it [the agent] has no such ... principles of choice governing
what decisions it makes in light of its initial reasons for action,
then the decisions it makes are rationally speaking random: they
are made by an agent-self that is, in its role as decision-maker,
entirely non-rational in the present vital sense of 'rational': it is
reasonless, lacking any principles of choice or decision. 24
In Strawson's second argument/5 the claim is not that the agent who
chooses to perform act A for a reason R must have chosen to have R, but
that he must have a principle P for choosing to perform A for R.
Otherwise, the choice to perform A for R will be random. At this point,
it is important to distinguish two senses of randomness. The first sense
is that of being non-rational or being made for no reason at all. The second is that of being neither rational (made for a good reason) nor irrational (made for a bad reason). Consider, again, the woman who is
thinking about becoming involved with her colleague at the office.
Suppose that she chooses to remain faithful to her husband, B, in order
to fulfill her marital commitment to him (in order to act morally, as
opposed to immorally), R. Strawson's claim seems to be that unless
some P exists in light of which choosing to do B for R is justified or
unjustified, good or bad (let P be "One ought always to act morally, for
good reasons, and not immorally, for bad reasons"), then the woman's
choosing to do B for R is random or reasonless in the sense of being neither rational nor irrational, even though it is not non-rational.
If we assume, as seems plausible, that P exists, then Strawson proceeds to raise the following objection:
The actions are now once again performed for, and are truly
explicable just by reference to, [principles]. But, by the same
token, the original objection regarding the fact that the agent
cannot be self-determined with respect to these [principles]
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applies once again with full force. 26
In other words, Strawson seems to believe that if P is not chosen by
the agent for some reason, then ultimately the agent cannot be free and
responsible for his choice to do A for R. But for the agent to choose P, he
would have to have an additional principle P', in virtue of which he
chooses P, ad infinitum.
This argument is a reformulation of the first objection, and the answer
to the latter is applicable here. There is no more reason to think that an
agent has control over and is able to choose P, than there is reason to
think that he has control over and is able to choose R. Moreover, there is
no reason to think that he must have this kind of control and choice in
order to be able to choose freely and responsibly to do A for R.
Choices are essentially uncaused mental actions done for reasons.
How, it might be asked, can reasons explain choices if they do not cause
them? The answer to this question is that reasons are teleological explanations of choices. Choosing for a reason is choosing for a purpose.
Teleological explanation is not a form of causal explanation but a distinct and irreducible form of explanation. In general, teleological explanation involves an agent (i) conceiving of the future as including a state
of affairs which is an end to be produced, where this end is provided in
the propositional content of a belief or a desire,27 (iO conceiving of the
means to its realization, where the means begin with his performing an
action (unless the action itself is the end, in which case there will be no
means), and (iii) performing that action in order to bring about the end.
In trying to account for freedom, agent-causationists try to explain
every event in terms of causation on the the grounds that everyone
believes in the principle of universal causality-everyone believes that
every event must have a cause. 28 Otherwise, they argue, at least some
events would occur randomly and inexplicably. Nevertheless, agentcausationists also claim that there are two kinds of explanation, teleological and causal, neither of which is reducible to the other.29
Agent-causationists are confused on the issue of explanation. It is
plausible to maintain that every event has an explanation (earlier I
termed this the 'principle of universal explanation') but implausible to
think that every event has a cause. Moreover, there are two kinds of
explanation, teleological and causal, neither of which is reducible to the
other. Sometimes one event will have both kinds of explanation (e.g., an
agent might cause an event to occur for a reason so that the effect event
is explained both causally and teleologically). However, choices,
because they are not effect events (they are uncaused), have only one
kind of explanation, namely, a teleological explanation-an explanation
in terms of a reason. Because a choice is an uncaused mental action it
has only a teleological explanation.
A frequent criticism of teleological explanation says that teleological
explanation must be a form of causal explanation because, if it were not,
there would be no way to account for the distinction between having a
reason to choose and choosing with it and having a reason to choose and
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choosing because of it. 30 One may justify a choice by citing a reason one
has even if in choosing one did not choose because of it, but one cannot
explain a choice by citing a reason unless one chooses because of it.
To illustrate the objection, consider an executioner named Smith.
Smith is ordered to put to death a certain individual, Charles. Charles
was caught in the act of, confessed to, and was convicted for murdering
a woman who happens to have been Smith's wife. Smith has two reasons for putting Charles to death. On the one hand, he believes that it is
his job and moral duty to put to death persons guilty of the heinous
crime of murder. On the other hand, Smith desires to get revenge
against Charles by killing him. Smith has more than one reason to kill
Charles. Both reasons justify the act. After putting Charles to death,
Smith tells a reporter that he chose to put Charles to death in order to
carry out what he believed was his job and moral duty, and he did not
choose to kill him in order to get revenge. According to the critic, this
can only mean that Smith's having the one reason caused him to make
the choice and his having the other reason did not. But this is not the
only way to explain Charles' choice. The distinction drawn to our attention by the critic can be accounted for on a teleological explanation of
Smith's choice. On the teleological view of explanation, Smith chose to
put Charles to death in order to fulfill his job and moral duty. Even
though he had more than one reason which justified his choice, only one
explained it, namely, the one which gives the purpose for which he
chose.31
Given the plausible distinction in Smith's case between his putting
Charles to death in order to carry out what he believed was his job and
moral duty as opposed to putting Charles to death in order to get
revenge, the noncausal agency theorist has a way to account for the distinction between having a reason and choosing with it and having a reason and choosing because of it. How is this teleological understanding
of explanation any less effective as a way of accounting for this distinction than saying that one reason caused the choice and the other did
not? Three arguments which a nonlibertarian critic might make are as
follows:
First, a critic might argue that the causal theorist's account is superior
because it is a more complete explanation. The causal theorist can say
that causation involves laws and the reason which caused the choice did
so because it and the choice are describable, at some level, in terms
which make reference to laws. The noncausal theorist's account of the
relationship between a reason and a choice is inferior because it cannot
be further explicated in this way.
At this point, the causal theorist has just begged the question against
the noncausal theorist. The point ultimately at issue between them is
whether there are, at any level of description, lawlike explanations of
choices. The noncausal agency theorist maintains that there are not and
it is not an argument against his position to say that causal explanation
is a more ultimate or genuine form of explanation because it involves
nomic concepts. The truth is that with the distinction between causal
and teleological explanation one has reached two irreducible ways of
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explaining events. There is no sound argument which will prove that
the latter form of explanation is less basic than and a form of the former.
Second, a critic might argue that it may be asked of Smith why he
chose to put Charles to death in order to fulfill his moral duty and not in
order to get revenge. Why did Smith choose to execute Charles for the
one reason and not for the other? If there is no answer to this question,
was not the choice fortuitous? If it was fortuitous, how can Smith be
free and responsible?
Interpreted in one way, the critic's question plausibly suggests the
existence of something like the previously acknowledged principle P
which made Smith's choosing to put Charles to death for the reason that
he did rational, as opposed to irrational. Interpreted in a second way,
however, the critic's question wrongly implies that there must have been
an explanation for why Smith made the rational choice as opposed to
the irrational one. On this second reading, the critic's question assumes
the reality of what does not exist (compare the question: 'Why did you
beat your wife?' asked of a man who has not beaten his wife). Moreover,
it is precisely because there is no explanation of the kind which is sought
for in the critic's question that Smith's choice is the locus of his freedom
and responsibility.32
Third, a critic might maintain that to say, in the situation as described,
that Smith was free to choose and chose as he did for the one reason and
not for the other is unsatisfying. One wants to know more about what
makes the one reason and not the other the reason for which he chose to
act, given that at the time of choosing he was aware of both reasons for
acting. Must there not be, say, some kind of counterfactual among the
truth conditions of his choice, a counterfactual such as 'If Smith had not
believed that putting Charles to death was his job and moral duty, then
he would not have chosen to put Charles to death.'?
In the case of Smith, there is no reason to think that the truth conditions of his choice include or entail a relevant counterfactual. Because
Smith has more than one reason for putting Charles to death, he could
have lacked the reason for putting Charles to death upon which he acted
and still have chosen to put Charles to death. Thus, in a counterfactual
situation where Smith is no longer an executioner but Charles has murdered his wife, Smith could still have chosen to kill Charles in order to
get revenge.
That a reason is an adequate explanation of a choice need not imply
that there exists a counterfactual dependence of the choice on that reason such that if that reason had not existed, the choice would not have
been made. '3 It does not imply this in a case of freedom such as that
involving Smith and Charles. However, it is false to conclude from this
example that explanation of a choice in terms of a reason will never
imply the assertion of a counterfactual dependence of the suggested
kind. For example, in a case where an agent has a reason to perform an
action A, a reason not to perform A, but no other reason to perform A, if
it had been the case that the agent lacked that reason for doing A and
acquired no other reason to A, then he would not have chosen to A. This
is because an agent can only choose to A in a situation where he has a
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reason to A. But in this counterfactual situation, he lacks such a reason.
Because teleological explantion involves an agent conceiving of his
action as a means to an end or as an end in itself, if he were no longer to
conceive of his action in either of these ways, he would no longer have a
reason to perform it.
In summary, genuine explanation of a choice in terms of a reason
does not always imply a true counterfactual which states that had the
agent not had that reason, then he would not have chosen as he did.
Sometimes such a counterfactual will be implied and sometimes it will
not. But even in cases where it is implied, there is no reason to think
that the conncection which links the reason and the choice is causal in
nature. A teleological relation between the reason and the choice is most
plausible and adequately accounts for the dependence of the choice on
the reason. There is no reason to insist that this dependence must be
understood causally which does not in one way or another assume the
truth of determinism.
It is important to point out that some libertarians have mistakenly
believed that teleological explanation alone cannot account for the distinction between having a reason and choosing with it and having a reason and choosing because of it. For example, Timothy O'Conner has
recently maintained that a noncausal libertarian theory cannot account
for the distinction between having a reason to choose and choosing with
it and having a reason to choose and choosing because of it. There must
be something to link the reason to choose and the choice made for that
reason. O'Conner believes that this link must be causal in nature and
develops what he regards as an agent-causationist account of freedom in
which an agent has the causal capacity to cause the coming to be of an
intention to act. The coming to be of an intention is an event-part of a
decision (choice) which is made for a reason. Most important for present considerations is O'Conner's view that the causation by the agent of
the coming to be of an intention has no cause and is "dependent upon
the reason he has ... for acting [deciding] in that way. . .. For the
agent's free exercise of his causal capacity provides a necessary link
between reason and action, without which the reason could not in any
significant way explain the action."34
Does O'Conner's agent-causationist account of freedom avoid the
problem which he claims undermines the noncausallibertarian's explanation of freedom? No. If there is a problem with explaining how a reason explains an uncaused choice, there is a problem with explaining
how a reason can explain an agent's uncaused exercising of his power to
cause the coming to be of an intention, where the exercising of this
power depends upon the reason for the decision of which the coming to
be of the intention is a part. Since there is no problem for the noncausal
libertarian who asserts that a reason alone can explain an uncaused
choice, agent-causation is superfluous to an adequate account of agency.
My position on teleological explanation is that the explanatory connection between a reason and the action performed for that reason is
primitive and unanalyzable. Ginet is a libertarian who believes that this
connection can be explicated in terms of an intention to act. On his
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view, an action is explicable in terms of an intention had by the agent at
the time of performing an action, where the intention refers directly to
the action and its content specifies that the action is being done in order
to fulfill the remembered reason for performing it. To illustrate his position, Ginet takes an agent 5 who urgently needs her glasses which she
has left in R's room where R is now sleeping.
5 has some desire to wake R, because she would then have R's
company, but also some desire not to wake R, because she
knows that R needs the sleep. 5 decides to enter R's room in
order to get her glasses, knowing as she does so that her action
will satisfy her desire to wake R. Could it nevertheless be true
that 5 did not intend of her action that it wake R? . .. It seems
right to say that 5 did not intend to wake R if 5 was so disposed
that, had it turned out that her entering the room did not wake
R, 5 would not have felt that her plan had failed to be completely realized, and she must then either wake R in some other way
or decide to abandon part of her plan. And 5' s being thus
uncommitted to waking R is quite compatible with 5' s expecting
and desiring to wake R.35
Ginet's view as applied to the case of Smith and Charles implies that
Smith executed Charles in order to fulfill his duty because he intended
of the execution that it fulfill his duty but he did not execute him in
order to get revenge because he did not intend of the execution that it be
done in order to get revenge.
Ginet has not succeeded in explicating the explanatory connection
between a reason and the free action (choice) performed for that reason
in terms of intention. This is because an intention (which is a commitment to act) is formed on the basis of a choice made for a reason. Free
agents such as 5 and Smith only intend to perform actions for reasons
because they first choose for those reasons to perform those actions. 36
Thus, while the concept of intention provides an explanatory connection
between the choice and the chosen action, it provides no such connection between the reason and the choice itself.
At this point, Ginet might argue that it is false to maintain that free
agents only intend to perform those actions which they first choose to
do. Free agents such as 5 and Smith also intend their choices to act.
They must intend those choices because their choices are teleologically
explained by reasons R and an intention is required to forge a link
between R and those choices.
To understand the inadequacy of this response, one needs to consider
how free agents are able to intend their choices on this view. What
explains such intentions to choose? The reasons R for which the choices
are made? But if R can explain these intentions directly, without the need
for something to forge an explanatory connection between the two of
them, why cannot R explain the choices directly, without the need for
intermediate intentions to link the choices with their reasons? If R do not
explain the intentions, perhaps further reasons R' explain them. But if free
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agents intend their choices for reasons R', will they not need second-order
intentions to link the first-order intentions with their reasons R'? Here, a
vicious regress seems unavoidable. The only way to avoid such a regress
is to say that free agents intend their choices for reasons R', and that is the
end of the matter. But if there is no problem with saying this, there is no
problem with saying that free agents such as 5 and Smith choose for reasons R, and that is the end of the matter. Thus, in the end, there is nothing
problematic with the libertarian position which maintains that choices are
teleologically explained for reasons and teleological explanation cannot be
explicated in terms of any other concept such as intention.
In written correspondence, Ginet has responded to my criticism of his
view by maintaining that he would prefer to talk in terms of the act of
adopting the intention to A, instead of the act of choosing to A. In this way,
the act of adopting the intention to A forges an explanatory connection
between A and the reason R for which A is done. Even if we concede to
Ginet his preference, it can still be shown that intention cannot plausibly be
used to forge an explanatory connection between A and R. This is because
adopting an intention is itself an act and, as such, is explained by a reason.
What forges an explanatory connection between the adopting of an intention and the reason for which it is adopted? Is there some further intention
which is adopted? If there is, then it will have to be adopted for a reason
and an explanatory connection will have to be forged between it and that
reason. A vicious regress like that described in the previous paragraph is
avoidable only by saying that an intention can be adopted for a reason
without any explanatory connection between it and that reason being
forged by a further intention. But if this is the case, then the explanatory
connection between a reason and the act of adopting an intention is ultimately primitive and unanalyzable and intention cannot be used in the
way Ginet suggests to clarify the nature of teleological explanation.3?
III
I conclude that the teleological explanation of an essentially uncaused
choice is a coherent concept which is supported by the epistemology of
choosing. Indeed, I maintain that the concept has the status of a conceptual truth. Theists would do well to take a libertarianism which asserts
this more seriously. As Plantinga notes, one essential component of theism is that God holds human agents responsible for what they do, and
that libertarian freedom is necessary for such responsibility.38 By seeking
to explain freedom in terms of agent-causation, the theist always, if ever
so slightly, undermines the thesis that we are really free and responsible.
This is because the inclusion of causation in any form raises the spectre of
causal determinism and the view that nothing is adequately explained
without it, which is precisely what the libertarian denies is true. If we
really are free in the libertarian sense, a free action is uncaused. 3Y
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